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If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Abstract
We investigate the semantics of messages, and argue that the meaning of a
message is naturally and usefully given in terms of how it affects the knowledge
of the agents involved in the communication. We see that the semantics de-
pends on the protocol used by the agents, and this leads us to knowledge based
specification of protocols. While these notions are natural for distributed com-
putations, we suggest that the considerations discussed here may be relevant
in more general linguistic contexts.
1 Introduction
In natural as well as formal languages, messages have an interesting semantic status.
Syntactically, they are perhaps no different from utterances, perhaps by speakers
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not present when the utterance is heard or received. But when we designate any
communication as a ‘message’, we invest it with a purpose, an accomplishment of
specific semantic objectives. Deriving the meaning of a message may well involve
much more than the syntactic structure of the message.
The famous lines from Longfellow’s poem “Paul Revere’s ride”, run:
He said to his friend, “if the British march
by land or sea from the town tonight,
Hang a lantern aloft in the belfry arch
Of the North church tower as a signal light, –
One, if by land, and two, if by sea;
And I on the opposite shore will be, . . .
It is obvious that Paul Revere is setting up a protocol with his friend whereby a
signal with two possible values can be used to indicate one of two alternatives. This
example illustrates several issues any semantics of messages needs to address. While
the hanging of a lantern is to show a light, doing this at a specific time, in a specific
‘state of the world’, by a specific person, carries a unique meaning to one who sees
the light, particularly when the two have agreed on a protocol for signalling, and the
latter trusts the former to follow the protocol.
Indeed, there is more. The meaning may also depend on the medium of commu-
nication in which the message passing takes place. If Paul Revere and his friend had
accurate, synchronized watches, much more information, e.g. the size of the British
force, could have been conveyed. To see this, suppose I want a friend to send me
information that will distinguish between a thousand possibilities, but my phone (or
his) is tapped by enemies, and he dare not talk to me. Here is our protocol. He
calls me, lets the phone ring once or twice, and hangs up. I then count the number
of minutes elapsed since 8 AM (he calls between 8 AM and 5 PM), which gives me
540 possibilities. The signal has two values, so in all that makes 1080, ample for my
purpose. Thus even though the signal has only two values, in the context it conveys
a little over 10 bits of information.
We spoke of the receiver of the message interpreting it according to an agreed
protocol. In fact, the message itself may be part of setting up the protocol between
the parties in a bootstrapping manner. Moreover, trust may not be necessary to
give meaning; the message may itself be for establishing trust in the receiver about
the sender. Consider the following case. A secret group which trusts only its own
members, is holding a meeting. A member who wants to attend the meeting must
identify himself by saying “rain in Spain is mainly in the plain”. Now clearly this
message does not have the usual meaning of that sentence. We cannot talk of the
knowledge the sentence creates in the presence of trust, since the purpose of this
message is to create trust. For the same reason, a letter of recommendation written by
an applicant himself does not create the same knowledge in the prospective employer
as an identical letter written by an unbiased authority.
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Essentially, all these considerations suggest that evaluating the meaning of a mes-
sage in a manner that is dependent on the protocol used by the communicating parties
gives us implicature as well. Then there is the additional dimension of dealing with
uncertainty. Of course, when the communicating parties are human beings, utilities
are also needed to evaluate meaning and implicature. Even in the case of machines
which may not have utilities, the designers of those machines do, and strategic con-
siderations may well bring utilities into the semantics of messages.
In this paper, we focus on distributed systems of computing agents that commu-
nicate (only) by message passing. We study how messages may be interpreted in
such systems, and the study illustrates how the informational value of the message
depends also on the protocol, without use of utilities. We suggest that a knowledge
based semantics of messages not only offers a solution to the difficulties listed above,
but also suggests a semantic specification of protocols using knowledge assertions.
The last point, about semantic specification of protocols, is important, and high-
lights the difference between extensional and intensional treatment of protocols, a
difference that is critical in the context of utilities. We have been discussing how the
meaning of a message is dependent on the protocol used, but how is the protocol itself
presented ? If a protocol is seen (extensionally) as a set of possible evolutions of the
considered system, such a set may be used in the semantics of messages. However,
we need a mechanism that generates these evolutions, which requires an intensional
description. In the context of distributed protocols studied in computer science, a pro-
tocol is simply a bunch of rules describing what messages each agent may send under
different circumstances, as well as the response of agents to the receipt of messages
(see [T94]). This may seem circular: the protocol is described using messages, and the
messages are interpreted according to the protocol. Knowledge based specification of
protocols offers a way out of such circularity, as we will see, see also [P95].
We suggest that knowledge based semantics of messages is also useful for the
theory of distributed systems. These are systems typically designed to achieve specific
algorithmic goals, and the concern is about efficient management of resources (number
of rounds of communications, length of messages etc). A general semantic theory,
which studies the transition structure of messages, is lacking. On the other hand,
concurrency theory does study the interaction of system structure and behaviour
in an abstract setting and thus provides semantic models, but offers no theories of
communication comparable in richness to that of theories of causal independence.
In the context of a distributed system, it is easy to see the role of a message.
An agent in a distributed system, at any local state, has only a partial view of the
system state. The purpose of a message is to offer the receiver an enhanced view of
the system state. Viewed thus, we can at once see a number of issues to be addressed
by any semantic theory of communication:
• It is easily seen that receipt of a message often causes a change of system
view. Does sending of a message also change an agent’s view ? When agents
communicate by the hand-shaking mode of synchronization, sending a message
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can certainly cause a view update. Even in the context of asynchronous message
passing, the sender can reason that on receipt of the message, the receiver’s view
would be updated at that state and record this information. Such reasoning
can be found in knowledge-based analyses of distributed protocols [FHMV95].
• The same message, sent by different agents, or received by different agents, may
cause different changes in system behaviour. Thus the semantics of messages
may depend on how agents are defined, and their behaviour in turn depends on
what messages mean to them.
• We can easily conceive of situations where an agent receiving the same mes-
sage at different states acts differently. Thus the meaning of a message is also
dependent on the receiver’s state.
• Clearly, messages are interpreted according to the protocol followed (implicitly)
by the agents, and systems where agents agree to change the protocol dynami-
cally do exist !
• Distributed protocols typically contain not only assumptions about agents send-
ing messages according to the protocols, but also actions to be taken when
agents’ messages violate the protocols. This is particularly problematic for se-
mantic models.
• Message based systems use a menagerie of message categories – signals, in-
terrupts, resource requests, data messages, control messages, and so on, and
implementations never treat them the same way. On the other hand, a seman-
tic model should perhaps not even consider messages as concrete objects, but
yet offer possibilities of modelling such behavioural variations.
• Suppose a single message m has the same effect as a sequence of messages σ.
While m and σ must needs be distinguished from an algorithmic point of view,
they should both perhaps be identified as having the same denotation.
• What is communicated by the message may be not only current information,
but also temporal information about possible future behaviour.
Our basic technical tool is as follows:
• States are specified by properties stated in a logical language and the view of an
agent at a state can be thought of as those global properties which are known
to that agent at that state.
• The denotation of a communication is then a set of pairs of the form (α, β) such
that if, at any local state of an agent s, the global property α is known by the
agent, then in the next state of the agent, the global property β will be known
by that agent.
In what follows, we present a logical framework in which this idea is developed
formally.
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2 An abstract model
We will first consider an abstract extensional presentation of a distributed system,
in which the system is described as a set of global histories, each of which represents
one possible system evolution given by a sequence of global events. For each system,
the set of agents that participate in its computations is assumed to be a fixed finite
set. Similarly, for each system, the set of possible global events is fixed.
For convenience, we fix n > 0, and consider only systems with agents from [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n}, and events come from a fixed (possibly infinite) set E. E∗ is the set of
all finite sequences over E and Eω is the set of all infinite sequences over E; we will
let h, h′, . . . range over the former, and H,H ′, . . . over the set E∗ ∪ Eω. Let H  H ′
denote that H is a finite prefix of H ′. We write hH ′ to denote the concatenation of
finite history h with the possibly infinite history H ′. When H is infinite or of length
≥ k, we let Hk denote the finite prefix of H consisting of the first k elements. For
a set H, let P(H) denote the set {h | h  H for some H ∈ H} containing all finite
prefixes of sequences in H.
Definition 2.1 A system is a tuple S = (H, d1, . . . , dn), where H ⊆ Eω is the set
of all (infinite) possible global histories of S, and for i ∈ [n], di: P(H) → E∗ is the
projection map for i. Hi def= {di(h) | h ∈ P(H)} is the set of local histories of i.
Thus local histories are got by projecting global histories to local components.
Note that the definition is very general, and we may want more conditions to apply
usually: for instance, if h1  h2  H ∈ H}, then we would expect that di(h1)  di(h2)
as well, but this is not enforced by the definition above. The points we wish to
illustrate may already be highlighted with such a general description.
Definition 2.2 Let h, h′ be finite global histories in H. For i ∈ [n], define h ∼i h′ iff
di(h) = di(h′).
Clearly, ∼i is an equivalence relation, and it gives the indistinguishability relation
for i. We can consider this relation as giving the information partition for i in the
system S; that is, given the information available to i, the histories h and h′ cannot
be disntinguished. Note again that we may have histories h1, h2, h such that h1 6∼i h2
but h1h ∼i h2h (constituting a kind of ‘forgetting’).
The properties of such systems can be studied in a logical language. Let L be a
language which has formulae expressing (time dependent) properties of global histo-
ries. Then we can write H, k |= A, for A belonging to L, to mean that the history H
satisfies formula A at time k. If the truth value of A does not depend on k, then it
is timeless. If A has the property that once true it remains true, then it is persistent.
We expand L to a larger language LK by closing under boolean connectives and
operators Ki. Thus if A is a formula of LK and i is a process, then Ki(A), meaning
i knows A, is also in LK. We can then define H, k |= Ki(A) to hold if for all m and
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all H ′ ∈ H, if H ′m ∼i Hk then H ′,m |= A. Clearly what the process i knows at time
k depends only on its local history. Moreover, the laws of logic LK5 (the S5 version
of the logic of knowledge) are valid.
For definiteness, we fix a specific language L so that the semantics of H, k |= A is
also fixed. Since the basic elements of the model are sequences, a linear time temporal
logic suggests itself. Let P = {p0, p1, . . .} be a countable set of atomic propositions.
Formally, the syntax of the logic is given by:
α, β ∈ L0 ::= p ∈ P | ¬α | α ∨ β | ©α | αUβ | Kiα
Amodel is a pairM = (S, V ), where V : P(H)→ 2P is a valuation map on finite
prefixes of global histories which gives the truth values of some atomic predicates at
the states. We can now inductively define the notion H, k |= α, for H ∈ H, k ≥ 0
and α ∈ L0:
• H, k |= p iff p ∈ V (Hk), for p ∈ P .
• H, k |= ¬α iff H, k 6|= α.
• H, k |= α ∨ β iff H, k |= α or H, k |= β.
• H, k |=©α iff H, k + 1 |= α.
• H, k |= αUβ iff there existsm ≥ k such thatH,m |= β and for all ` : k ≤ ` < m,
H, ` |= α.
• H, k |=Kiα iff for all m ≥ 0, for all H ′ ∈ H such that Hk ∼i H ′m, H ′,m |= α.
The formula α is said to be satisfiable if there exists a model M , a global history
H ∈ H in M and k ≥ 0 such that M,k |= α. α is said to be valid iff ¬α is not
satisfiable. The following formulas, the laws of logic LK5, are easily seen to be valid:
• Ki(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Kiα ⊃ Kiβ).
• Kiα ⊃ α.
• Kiα ⊃ KiKiα.
• ¬Kiα ⊃ Ki¬Kiα.
We are now ready to present the knowledge based semantics of messages in a
system S. For our purpose, a message is simply an element m ∈ E.
Definition 2.3 SemS(i,m)
def
= {(α, β) | (∀H ∈ H)(∀k ≥ 0)(H, k |=Kiα→
(∀h′ ∈ P(H)(Hk  h′, |h′| = ` ≥ k ∧ di(h′) = di(Hk)e)(H ′` |=Kiβ},
i.e. {(α, β) | for all H ∈ H, for all k ≥ 0, if H, k |= Kiα then, for all h′ ∈ P(H)
such that Hk  h′, h′ is of length ` ≥ k and di(h′) = di(Hk)e, we have H ′, ` |=Kiβ}.
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Intuitively, if i knows α before the message m then it always knows β after it.
Thus Sem(i,m) is a subset of L0 × L0, and every pair (α, β) in it can be seen as a
view transformer for agent i: if knowledge of α is part of the view that i has of the
global system state before the communication event, then knowledge of β is part of
its view after the communication.
It is easy to see that the definition can be generalized to SemS(i, h), where h ∈ E∗:
SemS(i, h)
def
= {(α, β) | for all H ∈ H, for all k ≥ 0, if H, k |= Kiα then, for all
h′ ∈ P(H) such that Hk  h′, h′ is of length ` ≥ k and di(h′) = di(Hk)h, we have
H ′, ` |=Kiβ}. The following proposition records some simple observations that follow
from the validities listed earlier.
Proposition 2.4 1. If (α, β) ∈ SemS(i, h) and γ1 ⊃ α, β ⊃ γ2 are valid formulas,
then (γ1, γ2) ∈ SemS(i, h) as well.
2. If (Kiα, β) ∈ SemS(i, h), then (α,Kiβ) ∈ SemS(i, h) as well.
3. If (Kiα, β1) ∈ SemS(i, h) and (Kiα, β2) ∈ SemS(i, h), then (α,Ki(β1 ∧ β2)) ∈
SemS(i, h) as well.
4. If (α, β) ∈ SemS(i, h) and (β, γ) ∈ SemS(i, h′) then (α, γ) ∈ SemS(i, hh′).
Condition 1) above ismonotonicity and holds because we regard all possible global
histories as equal. However, if the possible global histories are ordered by plausibility,
then monotonicity will fail. I.e. the most plausible interpretations of the message
m in the presence of α (and in which β does hold) might no longer be possible in
the presence of the stronger formula γ and in that case we can no longer rely on β
holding.
Thus we can use knowledge formulas to describe changes effected by a sequence
of events; dually, we may consider such pairs of formulas as a specification, and ask
what sequence of events implements the specification.
Proposition 2.5 Suppose we are given two systems S = (H, d1, . . . , dn) and S ′ =
(H′, d1, . . . , dn) which are identical in their structure except that H′ ⊆ H. Let α, β
be two formulas in which all occurrences of the operators Ki are positive, i.e. occur
under no negation signs or under an even number of them. Then if (α, β) is in
SemS(i,m), it is also in SemS′(i.m).
The proof is straightforward using the fact that the quantification over histories
of S ′ is always over a smaller set and hence more likely to be true. Thus given a set
of conventions which restrict the set os possible histories, more information can be
acquired through a message. This of course need not hold with negative knowledge.
It may happen that in a larger H, after message m is received, some ¬Ki(β) holds,
but that with a smaller H′, Ki(β) does hold and hence ¬Ki(β) fails.
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For a very simple example, if you tell me β but the global histories in H allow the
possibility of your lying, then I do not know β. If we restrict the global histories to
those in which you never lie, then I do know β.
We can observe that our semantics satisfies many of the criteria set out in the last
section. The denotation of a message is dependent on the protocol in a crucial manner.
For instance, fix a system S and let m be an event such that for all h, h′ ∈ P(H), if
di(h′) = di(h)m, then h′ = hm′m; that is, though m′ is external to i, or ‘invisible’ to
i, when m occurs, i gets the information that m′ has occurred as well.
Note that the only condition that the Sem definition insists on is that the event
m be ‘visible’ to i via the di map. Thus, when m is the sending of a message in an
asynchronous system, our semantics allows for the event to have non-trivial meaning
for the sender as well. This is important in protocols where the sending by itself starts
a chain of events in all histories, without the sender receiving any later information
explicitly. For example what you knew before sending a nasty email to your boss,
e.g., that he regarded your job as secure, might no longer be true after you send that
message, even though you have not, so far, heard anything from him.
Moreover, it can be seen that in this framework, the meaning of a message may
vary depending on the identity of the sender or the receiver, their state (at the time
of sending or receiving), and on the medium of communication. The event m in
Sem(i,m) may also be a synchronous ‘hand-shake’ type of communication involving
more than one agent, and the meaning may be different for each of the participating
agents. Finally, code messages like “rain in Spain is mainly in the plain” that seek to
establish trust among agents may also be given meaning in a uniform manner.
Thus we see that even though the messages are just strings, and do not necessarily
belong to a language for which we already have a semantics at hand, we can still
assign a semantics to them. The situation is a little like the one where we arrive on
some strange planet and do not know the language nor is there any interpreter. After
some experience we learn to interpret your language. Following Quine, we might
never know for sure whether your word gavagai refers to a rabbit or a rabbit part.
But if we do not, it is because the histories in which rabbit parts appear and those
in which rabbits appear are the same and hence as properties of histories these are
indentical.
2.1 Formulas as messages
It is interesting to consider systems where the messages sent are themselves formulas
of the logic considered. This requires a notion of honesty among agents. Fix a system
S. As in [Pa], call an agent i honest iff for all h ∈ P(H), if h(sendi α) ∈ P(H) then
h |= Kiα. Thus, when an agent j receives the message, she knows that α was true
when it was sent, and if α is a persistent formula, then j knows that it is still true.
(A formula α is said to be persistent, if, whenever h |= α, then for all h′ such that
h  h′, we have: h′ |= α.)
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[HF] define a processor to be honest if it sends a formula only when it knows it
to be true. If one receives the formula γ from such an honest processor as message
then we would expect that (α, β) ∈ Sem(i, γ) iff β is a logical consequence of α ∧ γ.
If α ∧ γ is inconsistent or if γ is not persistent then complexities arise.
Moreover, there are other possible definitions of honesty. One is that a message
should be known to be true when received rather than when sent. For example, if a
boy knows that his girl friend, at another college, always reads his letters under her
favourite tree, he may start his letter with “You are now sitting under your favourite
tree, reading this letter . . . ”, and we may not want to say that he is dishonest just
because that statement was not true at the time he wrote that letter. In fact, if the
postal system is unreliable, then the message is true only if and when it is received.
To give an example (due to Dexter Kozen), of a non-persistent formula if I tell
you the formula γ where γ is: “you don’t know this, but there is a bug crawling
on your shirt”. Then in this case γ as a message does have the semantic value of a
formula, but that formula is not γ. In fact, γ becomes false in the process of being
told and so it is logically impossible for you to know γ. Rather you learn, “there is a
bug crawling on my shirt and I did not know it”.
3 Intensional description of protocols
We have been considering systems given as sets of global histories. As we observed in
the last section, while this stance suffices to make our central point about assigning
meanings to messages, it may give rise to systems which are not realisable. As an
example, consider a system where, for some H ∈ Eω, every prefix h of H is in P(H)
but H 6∈ H. Such a system cannot be realised by finite means, and indeed, one may
wonder how such systems may even be presented. Thus reasonable descriptions of
systems would place many closure conditions on H.
Finite presentations (or specifications) of protocols are quite relevant for this dis-
cussion. If the meaning of a message may depend on the protocol used by agents,
it is reasonable to ask how the protocol itself is given, so that such semantics may
be ‘computed’. Closely related to this is the question of what options an agent has
at any point in time, and how the agent chooses one. Note that this is where utility
and informativity of a message may play a critical role ([vR01]), particularly when
the agent operates in an uncertain environment. In such a situation, the protocol
determines the strategies available to an agent at any local state.
We first note that there are two distinct notions of protocols, both relevant, which
are best explained by means of an example. When the notion of function was used in
analysis, at first it meant simply a formula. E.g. polynomials and rational functions
are easily expressed by means of formulae. Later this usage widened to include more
general definitions and only with the advent of set theory do we have the most general
notion of a function as a set of ordered pairs. The first two meanings are intensional,
and the last is extensional.
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If an individual process in a distributed computation needs to decide what its
possibilities are for its next action, its decision can depend only on what it knows. If
we already know which horse is going to win, before we place the bet, then life will
be simple. Unfortunately that decision has to be made on the basis of what is known
before the race is run. So clearly, if X is the set of possible next actions for some
process i, with local history h, then X must depend functionally on h. The exception
to this rule is a message received from the outside where the role of the process itself
is passive.
In the context of distributed computing the message must have been sent by
another process. Thus the value of the message is a function of the local history of
that other process, and functionally dependent on the (current fragment of) global
history. However in the context where a process or a group of processes are interacting
with ‘the world’ about which they do not have complete information, they may still
have some idea of the limitations on the set H of global histories. E.g. a young man
receiving a letter from his fiancee might not know what the letter says or even what
protocol if any she is following. Nonetheless he does know that the letter must have
been mailed before receipt and hence cannot contain a reference to today’s breaking
news.
Thus an intensional description of a protocol is one that specifies, for each agent,
at any finite global history, what global event that agent may participate in. This
corresponds to the standard way protocols are described (informally but intuitively)
in distributed algorithms, as a set of rules that specify when an agent may send a
message, and what an agent must do on receipt of a message.
In fact, impossibility proofs like those in [FLP] and [LF] are really logical theorems
about knowledge and the non-existence of intensional protocols such that the corre-
sponding extensional protocol has some desired property. Similarly the unsolvability
of the co-ordinated attack problem in the presence of asynchronous communication
says that if an extensional protocol allows for the possibility of acquiring common
knowledge, then the message mechanism in any corresponding intensional protocol
cannot be asynchronous.
Returning to knowledge based semantics of messages, we have an apparent circu-
larity when we consider intensionally presented protocols: the protocol talks of when
messages be sent and what to do on receipt of a message, and the meaning of the
message depends on the protocol used. This is resolved by considering only those
extensional protocols as models of knowledge formulas that can be realised by inten-
sional protocols. In this case, we can turn the problem around, and consider pairs of
knowledge formulas to be intensional specifications of protocols.
For such an attempt to make sense, we need to demonstrate the following. If a
knowledge formula has an extensional protocol as a model, then there is an inten-
sional protocol which realises it. Moreover, we need to do this somehow for pairs of
knowledge formulas that constitute semantic content of messages as defined earlier.
We first note that when (α, β) is in Sem(i,m) for an agent i and event m, α
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and β are global formulas but refer to successive local time instants for agent i. We
therefore move to a logical framework where Kiα and Kiβ are local formulas when
α and β are global formulas, and the © modality is also local, so that the pair (α, β)
can be specified by a formula of the logic. We can then ask what properties must
be satisfied by Sem(i,m) so that we can actually construct, from the models, local
‘choice’ or ‘strategy’ functions for each agent. While we do not solve the problem
here, we set up the framework so that the problem may be posed precisely. Rather
than functions, we will present the agents as action labelled transition systems, which
specify, for each agent, at any local state, what actions it can perform, based on its
knowledge at that state.
We need some preliminaries, and some changes in definitions. A distributed alpha-
bet is an n-tuple Σ˜ = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn), where for each i ∈ [n], Σi is a finite nonempty
alphabet of i-actions and for all i 6= j, Σi ∩ Σj = ∅. Σ =
⋃
i
Σi is the set of system
actions, and we use a, b, c etc to refer to elements of Σ. The condition that Σi∩Σj = ∅
for i 6= j, reflects the absence of synchronizations (or ‘shared actions’), and hence a
communication from i to j must be split into a send action in Σi and a receive action
in Σj.
In the description of systems, we now give the states of agents explicitly (since
these describe the information available to agents at different points in time), and
derive the projection operations instead. Let (Q1, . . . , Qn) be an n-tuple, where Qi is
the set of possible local states of agent i. The product Q˜ = (Q1 × . . .×Qn) consists
of possible global system states. We will use x, y etc. to denote global states, and
the notation x[i] to denote the i-local state in the ith component of x. A run of
the system is a sequence δ = x0a0x1a1 . . ., where for k ≥ 0, xk is a global stste and
ak ∈ Σ is a system action, such that, when ak ∈ Σi, for all j 6= i, xk[j] = xk+1[j].
This legality condition ensures that only the agent participating in an action changes
state.
Formally, a system over the distributed alphabet Σ˜ = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn) is a tuple
S = (Q1, . . . , Qn,R), where Q1, . . . , Qn are the local states of agents in [n] and R is
a set of (infinite) runs of S. As before, we will consider P(R), the set of partial runs,
which are finite prefixes of runs ending in system states.
Given a partial run δ, we can define a sequence di(δ) ∈ Q∗i by erasing all actions
not in Σi and projecting down only i-local states. We can then define δ ∼i δ′ iff
di(δ) = di(δ′).
We will also change the syntax of the logic to talk of local knowledge assertions.
Fix countable sets of propositional letters (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), where Pi consists of the





Pi. Let i ∈ [n]. The syntax of i-local
formulas is given below:
Φi ::= p ∈ Pi | ¬ α | α1 ∨ α2 | © α | α1 U α2 | K ψ, ψ ∈ Ψ
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Global formulas are obtained by boolean combination of local formulas:
Ψ ::= α@i, α ∈ Φi | ¬ ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2
Thus the formulas are defined by mutual recursion, with i-local knowledge formu-
las refering to global properties, and global formulas being boolean combination of
formulas of the form α@i, where α is a local formula.
Models are now pairs of the form M = (S, V ), where V : Q → 2P such that for
q ∈ Qi, V (q) ⊆ Pi.
Consider an infinite run δ ∈ R. Let ρ = di(δ) = q0q1 . . .; by ρk we denote the state
qk. The notion that an i-local formula α holds at local instant k for agent i in ρ is
denoted ρ, k |=i α, and is defined inductively as usual:
• ρ, k |=i p iff p ∈ V (ρk), for p ∈ Pi.
• ρ, k |=i ¬α iff ρ, k 6|=i α.
• ρ, k |=i α ∨ β iff ρ, k |=i α or ρ, k |=i β.
• ρ, k |=i ©α iff | ρ |> k and ρ, k + 1 |=i α.
• ρ, k |=i αUβ iff there existsm ≥ k such that ρ,m |=i β and for all ` : k ≤ ` < m,
ρ, ` |=i α.
• ρ, k |=i Kψ iff for all m ≥ 0, for all δ′ ∈ R such that di(δ′m) = q0q1 . . . qk,
δ′,m |= ψ.
To define the semantics of global formulas, we need to relate global time instants
with local time instants. For this, we extend the di map appropriately: di(δ, 0) = 0.
di(δ, k + 1) = di(δ, k) + 1 if ak ∈ Σi and di(δ, k + 1) = di(δ, k), otherwise.
• δ, k |= α@i iff δ, di(δ, k) |=i α.
• δ, k |= ¬ψ iff δ, k 6|= ψ.
• δ, k |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff δ, k |= ψ1 or δ, k |= ψ2.
Note that the i-local formulaKψ1 ⊃ ©Kψ2 carries the same semantics as a pair
in Sem(i,m) before, when m ∈ Σi.
We can now ask, given a formula ψ, if for every model M = (S, V ) of ψ, there
exist transition systems (Qi,→i) such that R of S is obtained as the set of runs of
a system obtained by (suitably) taking a product of these transition systems. When
this question is answered positively, we have an intensional protocol in which messages
carry the same meaning as those given by knowledge formulas as above.
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In general, this is a hard question to answer. A partial answer to the question
may be attempted using techniques that involve the theory of tree automata. It is not
difficult to construct a nondeterministic Bu¨chi tree automaton for every formula such
that the models of the formula (in a technical sense) correspond exactly to the tree
language accepted by the automaton. However, decomposing the tree automaton into
individual transition systems for agents (thereby obtaining their ‘strategies’) seems
to be difficult.
In the highly restricted context of deterministic systems, we can work with Bu¨chi
word automata, and in such situations, the required decomposition can also be done,
along the lines of the exercise carried out in [R96a] and [R96b] for different logics.
Such an exercise happily also yields finite transition systems for individual agents, thus
demonstrating bounded memory intensional protocols. But then, in these systems,
the agents know which run they are involved in, which is a very unrealistic assumption.
4 The amount of information in a message
Dretske [D] makes a convincing case that a signal (single symbol or a string) that
may take one of n values can contain, on the average, at most log(n) bits of informa-
tion and cannot be used to distinguish between more than n possibilities. However,
Dretske’s arguments apply only to a very special situation where the signal is sent
asynchronously between fixed parties. As we have seen before, in the context of syn-
chronous communication, much more information may be conveyed. Thus we need
a more general theory of the amount of information received by a process, which
handles such cases satisfactorily.
We now consider situations where in intensional protocol, instead of just giving a
finite set of possible extensions to the current global history, actually assigns proba-
bilities to them. In this case we have a probabilistic protocol. For the purpose of the
discussion, we again revert to the abstract model based on histories studied earlier.
When H is global history and h is a local history of agent i, we write Proj(H, i, h)
to denote that there exists a k such that h = di(Hk).
We assume a probability measure on the set of all possible global histories with
the following property. If H is a history in the protocol, then for every k, the measure
m({H ′ | H ′k = Hk}) is positive. If the protocol arises from a probabilistic intensional
protocol, then such a measure will arise naturally from the probabilities of local events
at various moments. Otherwise we stipulate this as a condition on the protocol. The
assumption of positive measure is not strictly speaking necessary. We will be using
conditional probabilities. and it is shown in [PP1], [PP2] that using non-standard
analysis we can define conditional probabilities p(X/Y ) even when both X and Y
have zero measure. However if X and Y both have positive measure, then p(X/Y ) is
simply the measure m(X ∩ Y/m(Y )).
We now define the amount of information inf(h.m) contained in a signal m for
process i when its local history is h. It is −log(p(X/Y )), where Y is the set of all
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global histories such that Proj(H, i, h) and X is the set of all global histories such
that Proj(H, i, h;m).
Theorem 4.1 Let A be a formula such that at history h, A,¬A are equiprobable
to process i and m and m′ are messages such that if process i receives m, it will
know that A and if it receives m′, it will know that ¬A. Then the average amount
of information in m, m′ at h, (inf(h,m) + inf(h.m′))/2, is at at least 1 bit. More
generally, if A1, . . . , Ak are mutually exclusive formulas which are equi-probable to i
at h, and signals m1, . . . ,mk, will respectively result in i knowing A1, . . . , Ak, then the
average information in the signals at h is at at least log(k).
This fact is well known to information theorists and we skip the proof.
Theorem 4.2 If i does not know A at h and the subjective probability of A for i is p,
then the minimum amount of information in any signal m that results in i knowing
A is −log(p).
This is because the set of histories in which the signal m has been received is a
subset of the set of histories in which A is true and the latter has probability p.
Here the subjective probability of A for i at h is
m({H | H |= A and Proj(H, i, h)})/m({H | Proj(H, i, h)})
Note that none of the development above really depends on the assumption that
m is a message coming from outside. m can be replaced by an addition h′ to history
h and inf(h, h′) is the total information received by i between the local histories h
and h;h′. We can also define the amount of information received at the history h,
I(h) = inf(∅;h), where ∅ is the empty history.
Theorem 4.3 I(hh′) = I(h) + inf(h, h′). I.e. the information received between h
and h′ plus that received from the start to h, equals that from start to hh′.
Similarly we can define the information I(i, j, h) received by i about j’s knowl-
edge, during history h and it can be readily shown that:
Theorem 4.4 I(i, j, h) ≤ I(h).
It is easily seen that if the process i is deterministic, then all the information it
gets must come from outside. Moreover, if the process is itself probabilistic, then it
gets information from itself too (or from its own coin, if you like). This is also true
in the nondeterministic case, though there we do not have a measure of the amount
of information.
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We illustrate this by means of an example. Suppose there are two processes 1 and
2 which send each other messages. 1 sends a symbol which may be either a or b, and
on receipt, 2 sends a message which may be c or d, and so on. Then the e-protocol is
simply ((a + b)(c + d))ω. Now suppose that at some moment 1 decides to send only
a’s from now on. It then knows the formula, “there are only finitely many b’s”. But
it could not have learned this formula from its own local history which is finite. How
do we resolve this ?
Suppose in fact that the process i is a nondeterministic finite automaton which







where s0 is the initial state. If after the exchange bab it decides to send only b’s from
now on, then its local history is not bab, but s0bas0bs1 and the last s1 contains the
needed information. Thus the process 1 did not know in advance that it was going to
go into state s1, and it did not decide to go into state s1. Rather, that decision was
made from outside, by the scheduler, and it conveyed information to the process, just
as it does to us. Of course if the automaton were deterministic, then such acquisition
of information could not take place.
To show that issues here are complex, we now describe an example given to us
by Bill Gasarch. Let W be an undecidable r.e. set and we are given four numbers
m,n, p, q. We are allowed to ask God two questions and then we must decide which
of the four numbers are inW . At first sight this seems impossible as there are sixteen
possibilities, and we are allowed only two questions. However, there is a solution. 1
5 Understanding the Lion
There is some dispute about the exact import of what Wittgenstein meant by the
remark we have cited at the beginning of the paper. But there is an obvious sense
in which we do understand lions. If a lion growls, it very likely means “Scram!”
and surely does not mean, “I saw an elephant this morning”. So we do have some
understanding of lion language.
This can be easily modelled in our formal discussion. Note that when we defined
Sem(i,m) as a set of pairs of formulas, there is no need whatever to presume that
the language from which elements of Sem(i,m) are taken needs to be the same as the
1We use the two questions to find out from God how many of the four numbers are in W . After
we get the answer, say 2, we enumerate W (it is r.e.) until two of the four numbers have turned up.
At this point we know that the other two will not turn up.
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language from which elements of Sem(j,m) : i 6= j are taken. It is perfectly possible
for the languages of i, j to be private (syntactically) and yet the signal m conveys
the same meaning (as a set of possible global histories) to both sender and receiver.
2 Thus if the lashing of tail (`) by a lion is always followed by a charge c whereas
growling g is not, then in all global histories an ` event will be followed by a c event
and the formula pair (True, C) will be in Sem(i, `) but not in Sem(i, g) where C
stands for “The lion will soon charge”. i of course is us, the intended targets of the
charge.
We have a similar explanation for the arrangement between Paul Revere and his
friend. Let ` mean that the British come by land and s that the come by sea. Let
o be the event that one lantern is shown and t the event that two are shown. By
arrangement all sufficiently long global histories contain the sequence `, o or else the
sequence s, t. They never contain `, t or s, o. Now `, s are local events for the friend
and o, t for Paul Revere. Thus if L is the formula which is true when the British come
by land and S the formula which is true if the British come by sea, then the formulas
(True, L) is in Sem(p, o) and (True, S) in Sem(p, t).
When a Hindi speaker says jaldi!, after some experience an English speaker will
figure out that what is meant is quickly!. This is even more clear with a more colorful
word like phata-phut! which has the same meaning. When i, j are communicating,
ultimately the languages of both i and j describe sets of global histories and provided
that a formula A in i′s language is reliably followed by signal m, and expresses a set
of global histories X, j can, under favourable conditions figure out that m ‘means’ X
and need never know what A was. If B is j’s word for X then j will reliably interpret
m as meaning B.
The use of “Rain in Spain is mainly in the plain” can also be accomodated into
the history semantics. Let G be a group of conspirators, all of whom are informed
by the leader: “for this evening, our code sentence will be “Rain in Spain is mainly
in the plain”. Now the utterance of this sentence in the absence of any context is
highly unlikely. Thus if I am a member of the group and hear you say “Rain in Spain
is mainly in the plain”, then with high probability, your own local history includes
an event of hearing the communication from the leader and hence that you are a
member of the group. (Of course moles cannot be revealed this way). It is crucial
that the probability of hearing a code sentence accidentally should be low and hence
a sentence like “It is terrible that the US is planning to invade Iraq” cannot be used
as a code sentence.
2See [P94b] for a discussion of the case where because of vagueness the meanings are not the
same, but the signal does, nonetheless, result in an increase of utility measured in terms of the time
taken by an algorithm.
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6 Meaning and Implicature
In [Gri89] Paul Grice introduces the notion of implicature 3 where what is implicated
in an utterance is more than what is actually said. For instance the question “Do
you have any salt?” normally carries the implicature, “I’d like some”. How does
implicature differ from plain meaning?
This difference can also be explained in our framework. We defined Sem(i,m) to
be {(α, β) | for all H ∈ H, for all k ≥ 0, if H, k |=Kiα then, for all h′ ∈ P(H) such
that Hk  h′, h′ is of length ` ≥ k and di(h′) = di(Hk)m, we have H ′, ` |= Kiβ}.
This is the meaning of m for process i. But we can make this notion both wider
and narrower. Wider in the sense that we can remove i as a parameter and demand
that the meaning apply to all processes. This will be the semantic meaning of m
simpliciter. On the other hand, in restricted circumstances we may have more pairs.
Let us define Sem(h, i,m) to be {(α, β) | for all H ∈ H, for all k ≥ 0, if H, k |=Kiα
and di(H) =k h then, for all H ′ ∈ P(H) such that Hk  H ′, H ′ is of length ` > k
and di(H ′) = di(Hk)m, we have H ′, ` |=Kiβ}.
Now Sem(h, i,m) is likely to contain more pairs than Sem(i,m) since we are
restricting ourselves to histories H such that d(Hk) = h for some k. Thus we can
identify Sem(m) with the (conventional) meaning of m, Sem(i,m) with the meaning
of m for i, and Sem(h, i,m) to be the meaning of m for i in the context h. In general,
Sem(m) ⊆ Sem(i,m) ⊆ Sem(h, i,m).
To use Grice’s example, if h is a history which culminated with your car running
out of gas, m is the message that there is a gas station around the corner, and B is the
formula which is true iff the gas station is open, then the formula pair (True,B) will
be in Sem(h, i,m) but not in Sem(m). For example if I were renting an apartment
and wanted to know if I would be able to get gas for my car, then the statement that
there is a gas station around the corner would not carry the implicature that the gas
station was open at the time that the statement was made. However, it would carry
the implicature that it is open some time. The various implicatures do hold only
because we are assuming that the histories contain (only) sequences of co-operative
communications satisfying Grice’s requirements.
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